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Abstract 
In the 1980s, the US government encouraged the cooperation of industries with 
universities in order to bridge funding gaps and cope with global competitive 
markets through legislations that allow universities to start spin-off businesses and 
to generate profits from patents.  At the turn of the century, university 
partnerships with the private sector have greatly increased through research 
grants, licensing patents, and in some cases, the formation of new firms—mainly 
at research universities and in the hard sciences.  In response to these 
entrepreneurial opportunities, university administrators developed intellectual 
property policies to facilitate the commercialization of research.  The purpose of 
this study is to explore the differences across IP policies among nine research 
universities as potential sources of influence on faculty engagement in for-profit 
research ventures according to existing models of faculty role performance and 
achievement.   
 
 
Higher education has become increasingly driven to engage in market-oriented behaviors 
and many of the specific market-oriented activities involve university research partnerships with 
private industry.  This phenomenon, identified as academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), 
started in the 1980s as markets became increasingly globalized and funding to postsecondary 
education continued to decrease as faculty and universities moved towards greater participation in 
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post-industrial knowledge markets (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) and as competition for research federal 
funding became increasingly intensified within the higher education arena (Newman & Courtier, 
2001).  At the same time, the US government encouraged the cooperation of industries with 
universities in order to bridge funding gaps and cope with global competitive markets by introducing 
a number of laws to allow universities to participate in profit making and the development of 
products competitive in the global market (Altbach, 1999; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  These federal 
initiatives were largely a consequence of Reagan’s economic policy of open markets and less 
government intervention, which resulted in less federal support to federal agencies and more 
privatization (Altbach, 1999).   
The Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 was the first legislation that allowed universities to start spin-off 
businesses and to generate profits from patents (Campbell & Slaughter, 1999).  As a result, 
university partnerships with the private sector have greatly increased through research grants, 
licensing patents, and in some cases, the formation of new firms—mainly at research universities 
and in the hard sciences.  In response to these entrepreneurial opportunities, university 
administrators have established intellectual property (IP) policies to facilitate the commercialization 
of research (Olivas, 1992).  IP is defined as inventions, discoveries, procedures, know-how, and 
artistic productions; examples include computer software, chemical or biological procedures, and 
electronic or mechanical devices.  Little knowledge has been empirically documented regarding how 
well the wide variety of IP policies actually accomplishes the intended goals of university agents.  
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore differences across IP policies among nine research 
universities as potential sources of influence on faculty engagement in for-profit research ventures.   
From 1980 to 1995, research and development (R&D) federal support at universities and 
colleges increased by 51 percent however, due to the Bayh-Dole Act, industry support research 
increased by 203.8 percent (Gladieux & King, 1999).  These types of activities have increased 
material resources streams for research-oriented postsecondary institutions.  In addition, 
commercialization of research through patents has also been a source of professional prestige as an 
important symbolic resource for participating universities.  Therefore, private commercial 
partnerships and ventures have become both a symbol of prestige and a source of material funding 
for research universities (Slaughter, Campbell, Hollernan, & Morgan, 2002).  Currently, research 
universities are developing a culture in which external fund-raising is an ongoing responsibility: 
 
In most other states with first-class research universities, they 
figured out back some time in the '80s, if not before, that the states 
would do what they could do, but it wouldn't be enough to support 
competitive excellence and that the institutions themselves had to 
take ownership of their own revenue stream.  They had to raise 
money, and they had to commercialize their intellectual property, 
and they had to push their grants and contracts to the outside limit, 
and they had to make relationships with industry and business, and 
they had to make their auxiliary enterprises at least break even if 
not profitable, and so on (Buchholz 2002, p. A1). 
 
The preceding quote reflects the degree to which academic capitalism as the engagement in market-
like behaviors on the part of faculty and universities has become a dominant force within higher 
education in general and an even a stronger trend among research universities (Slaughter & Leslie, 
1997). 
Academic capitalism has also been fostered by significant changes in the nature of scientific 
research due to the development of new fields, techniques and projects involving hundreds of 
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researchers and millions of dollars—a phenomenon that has been dubbed "big science" (Zusman, 
1999).  For example, prior to fundamental breakthroughs in molecular biology and genetics, life 
scientists in universities were mainly conducting basic research and industrial laboratories were at the 
forefront of applied research.  The new developments in these fields combined with academy-
industries partnerships have given rise to an emerging biotechnology industry hosted mainly in 
research universities where academics in these fields have become part of a larger technological 
community involved in commercial activities (Powell & Owen-Smith, 2002). 
After the inception of the Bayh-Dole Act, university-based research with close ties to 
industry nearly doubled between 1980 and1990 (Zusman, 1999) and by the 1990s, there were 
roughly 1,000 university-industry research centers at more than 200 U.S universities.  At the turn of 
the new century, the number of universities involved in commercial ventures has increased eightfold 
and the number of university patents has increased fourfold (Slaughter et a. 2002).  Moreover, some 
of the traditional non-profit institutions have created for-profit subsidiaries or partnered with for-
profit firms and adopted other forms of commercialization by outsourcing and through high 
executive salaries (Newman & Courtier, 2001).   
However, academic capitalism is not a uniform phenomenon across higher education 
institutions.  The unevenness is primarily due to unequal distribution of research and development 
(R&D) funds among universities.  Zusman (1999) reported that the top 50 research universities in 
1995 accounted for 60 percent of the R&D academic expenses and the top 100 for the 80 percent.  
The distribution of funds across disciplines has been stable over the last two decades although 
uneven as well.  For example, faculty in engineering receive 79 percent of university-industry 
funding (Zusman, 1999) whereas around 54 percent of federal funds go to life sciences, 16 percent 
to engineering, 11 percent to physical sciences, and only 6 percent to social sciences and humanities 
(Gumport, 1999).   
As faculty engage in research with commercial potential and as the number of partnerships 
academia-industry grows, university administrators have invested a significant amount of resources 
in appropriate infrastructure to promote commercialization of research as a means to generate 
revenues through royalties and licenses (Olivas, 1992).  However, there are difficulties in having 
contractual arrangements and IP policies that accommodate the differing needs of industry, 
individual faculty members, and university campuses when the three parties have different objectives 
and cultures (Hum, 2000).  For instance, faculty have usually conducted basic research for non-
commercial reasons and their rewards system is based on priority of discovery and prestige rather 
than material stock options of royalties.  Conversely, industry representatives are motivated by 
profits as well as the challenges of product development and market risk (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).   
Other issues fostered by faculty partnerships with industry representatives include conflict of 
interests, restriction of information flow, shift power to non-academic personnel, universities' 
fragmentation into entrepreneurial fiefdoms, shifts of research priorities toward more marketable 
areas with the consequent distortion of traditional academic missions as well as both positive and 
negative impacts on graduate education (Campbell & Slaughter, 1999; Gumport, 1999; Powell & 
Owen-Smith, 2002; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter et al., 2002; Zusman, 1999).  In addition, as 
research universities compete against each other for federal funding, annual giving, earnings on 
endowment state agencies, internal savings, and other surplus-generating activities such as returns on 
patents and licenses, administrators try to promote these partnerships by controlling faculty research 
more than a decade ago and by offering external rewards to faculty such as wages and distribution of 
royalties (Hum, 2000). 
In sum, industry-university partnerships have provided university administrators, faculty 
members, and businesspersons with new relationships that are changing the nature of academic roles 
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and rewards (Campbell & Slaughter, 1999).  These professional shifts have had a variety of impacts 
on higher education; some–have been viewed quite positively—such as the generation of new 
sources of revenue noted above—while others are concerned that other unintended consequences 
may be having a negative impact on the academic profession.  The understanding of these shifts and 
their consequences is a relatively new area of study that provides a unique opportunity to investigate 
the reshaping of professional roles as well as the tensions and conflicts that surround such changes 
(Campbell & Slaughter, 1999).  
This exploratory study is designed to increase existing knowledge about the impact of IP 
policies on the promotion of commercial research activity within postsecondary institutions.  More 
specifically, this study analyzes the relationship between IP policies at nine public Research I 
universities with levels of faculty engagement with entrepreneurship.  In addition, this study uses the 
findings from this analysis to provide recommendations for increasing patenting levels at public 
Research I universities. 
Theoretical Framework 
 
The American professoriate is shaped simultaneously by the social, political and economic 
contexts of academic capitalism mainly in research universities and in those disciplines most closely 
aligned with the market (Campbell & Slaughter, 1999; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; Powell & 
Owen-Smith, 2002; Seashore, Blumenthal, Gluck, Soto, & Wise, 1986).  After reviewing existing 
literature on academic capitalism, we identified two major areas in which academic capitalism has 
influenced the academic profession in terms of faculty motivation to participate in partnerships with 
the private sector in Research I universities and primarily in the hard sciences.  These two main areas 
of influence are (1) faculty motivation and academic rewards systems and (2) administrative control 
over the faculty profession.  In this section, we review previous empirical results regarding these two 
areas and develop a conceptual framework for this study.  
 
Faculty Motivation and Academic Rewards Systems 
 
Seashore et al. (1989) conducted the first research on faculty attitudes towards partnerships 
with the private sector.  Based on two surveys with 778 life scientists and administrators from a 
sample of 30 mayor research universities, Seashore et al. found that the major factors that determine 
faculty interest towards relationships with industry include past success as measured by research 
publications, degree of establishment that faculty may have such as having more to sell, less 
motivated by traditional academic rewards, and having greater financial interests.  However, based 
on the finding of Agrawal and Henderson (2002) study, faculty involved in commercialization of 
research are a minority, even in institutions heavily involved with academic capitalism such as The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which holds most of the patents filed by American 
universities.  Moreover, most of the MIT faculty surveyed by Agrawal and Henderson estimated that 
their patents account for less than 10 percent of the knowledge transferred from their labs and 
nearly half of the surveyed faculty have never patented, in contrast to 60 percent of the faculty that 
publish in any given year.  
The findings above are consistent with existing knowledge about faculty motivation in 
general (e.g. Bellas & Toutkoushian, 1999).  More specifically, studies on faculty attitudes towards 
commercialization of research suggest that rewards are an important influence in faculty activity and 
that publishing research in peer reviewed journals is the recognized norm for academic achievement 
under traditional rewards structures (e.g. Hum, 2002; Kirk, 2002; Powell & Owen-Smith, 2002; 
Seashore et al., 1989; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  In fact, Agrawal and Henderson (2002) explain their 
 
Mendoza & Berger: Patenting Productivity and Intellectual Property Policies  
 
5 
result by observing that publishing academic papers as well as conducting basic research are far 
more rewarding and important activities for most faculty than patenting.  However, for private 
sponsors, secrecy of new knowledge, rather than broad dissemination, is essential for their survival 
in the competitive market of patents.  Therefore, the secrecy demanded by private sponsors on 
faculty works is in contradiction with traditional academic values regarding knowledge dissemination 
(Merton, 1975).   
Other studies of faculty show that internal motivations such as desire for recognition, 
science contribution, need for professional freedom, and development of their capabilities are 
stronger than external motivations such as monetary incentives, unless those monetary rewards 
allow them to do more research (Campbell & Slaughter 1999; Hum, 2000; Peltz & Andrews, 1976; 
Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter et al., 2002).  Slaughter et al. (2002) found that faculty prefer to 
engage in basic research over commercial endeavors because symbolic rewards have been 
institutionalized to be more highly valued than have more materially-oriented rewards such as stock 
options or royalties that are awarded for accomplishment of commercial research efforts.  In 
contrast, industry rewards are pecuniary and patents are the coin of the realm in the world of 
commercial science (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  According to these empirical studies, internal 
motivations and rewards structures and values are areas where most of the differences between 
industry and academic cultures exist.  The academic profession is abundant in resources of intrinsic 
motivation that supercede monetary incentives such as fascination of research, the enchantments of 
teaching, peer recognition, and prestige (Clark, 1997).   
The role of internal motivations and rewards structures in faculty behavior can be better 
understood through a framework of faculty role performance and achievement developed by 
Blackburn and Lawrence (1995), which integrates research on faculty role performance and 
productivity with motivation theories.  The following paragraphs are dedicated to a description of 
the main aspects of this framework and how it applies to faculty behavior in light of academic 
capitalism as it has been documented in previous empirical studies.   
The Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) framework models immediate and future faculty 
productivity as the result of interactions between faculty members as individuals and their work 
environment.  As the basis for this model, they classify existing motivation theories into two main 
groups, non-cognitive and cognitive.  Non-cognitive theories of motivation are based under the 
assumption that little or non-human cognition is required and that internal needs, personality 
dispositions, and external incentives and rewards affect individuals’ behavior in predictable ways.  
Cognitive theories of motivation assume that people make decisions about their behaviors by 
evaluating their capacity to respond and by estimating their possible losses and gains.  The properties 
of individuals used in this model are: 
1. Socio-demographic: including age, gender, race, ethnicity, and country of origin. 
2. Self-knowledge: including self-image, self-assessed competence and sense of self-efficacy as 
well as personal attributes, skills, internal needs, values, and dispositions. 
3. Career: including graduate socialization experiences, academic discipline, type of institution, 
positions held, career age and experience, and past accomplishments. 
4. Social knowledge: including how faculty perceive their work environment including 
individuals’ understanding of others’ expectations, views, and values.   
On the other hand, the properties of the work environment that affect behavior are: 
1. Environmental conditions: including structural and normative features of the institution 
such as fiscal well-being, geographical location, governance structures, policies, mission, 
facilities, and resources. 
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2. Environmental responses: including the various forms of formal feedback that faculty 
receive about their performance such as tenure reviews and students’ evaluations 
3. Social contingencies: including events that happen at a personal level such as childbirth and 
marriage.   
According to empirical studies on faculty entrepreneurship, this study applies the Blackburn 
and Lawrence (1995) framework by associating relevant environmental and individual properties 
relevant to faculty patenting productivity into the different components of their framework.  Figure 
1 is an adaptation of the Blackburn and Lawrence framework representing the components of their 
model and how they relate to faculty patenting productivity.  The thickness of the arrows represents 
the intensity of the influence from one component to another.    
Faculty productivity is defined in this study as the number of faculty patents facilitated by faculty 
engagement with entrepreneurship.  The salient environmental conditions that have fostered 
entrepreneurship in higher education include the shrinking federal research funding as well as the 
legislations by the federal government in order to promote academic entrepreneurship and industry-
academy partnerships.  A subsequent environmental response to these conditions is manifested in an 
enduring competition in higher education for research funds, which brings prestige to those 
institutions and faculty that successfully acquire such funds.  In addition, universities have 
responded to these environmental conditions by developing IP policies to facilitate the 
commercialization of research.  These policies have induced greater control over the faculty 
profession and monetary rewards to faculty in the form of funds for research, salary increases, and 
royalties from technology transfers.  The environmental conditions and responses brought by 
academic capitalism have influenced the social knowledge of faculty in departments involved in 
academic capitalism especially in regards to shared values and expectations.  However, the 
environmental responses are more directly related to the faculty profession and thus, they have a 
greater influence on social knowledge of faculty than do environmental conditions.  According to 
Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) framework, productivity influences environmental responses.  
Therefore, patenting productivity should influence competition for research funding as well as IP 
policies. 
Empirical evidence indicates that faculty in departments that are significantly involved with 
academic capitalism are receiving mixed messages regarding values and expectations of their work 
environment (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  This tension inhibits faculty from fully engaging in 
entrepreneurial behavior, which results in low patenting productivity.  These mix messages are due 
to traditional academic values in opposition to business-oriented values brought by academic 
capitalism.  For example, academic freedom, self-governance, peer recognition, publication of 
findings, and internal motivations and rewards are in opposition to secrecy of knowledge, control 
over the faculty profession by administrators, and monetary incentives. 
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Figure 1.  Conceptual framework for understanding faculty patenting productivity (based on 
the Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) framework of faculty role performance and 
achievement)
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Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) emphasizes the influence of individual characteristics on 
faculty social knowledge, behavior, and productivity.  This is consistent with Seashore et al.’s (1989) 
work, which is one of the few studies that found individual characteristics related to self-knowledge 
(such as individual dispositions, internal needs and self-image) that might affect faculty 
entrepreneurship.  Seashore et al. find that some faculty have greater disposition to monetary 
incentives than others and other studies regarding the influence of internal motivations in faculty 
behavior (Campbell & Slaughter 1999; Hum, 2000; Peltz & Andrews, 1976; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; 
Slaughter et al., 2002).  Nonetheless, more research in these areas is needed in order to better 
understand other findings such as Agrawal and Henderson’s (2002) identification of differences in 
the level of engagement with entrepreneurship among faculty members with different individual 
self-knowledge characteristics.   
Staw (1983) developed a model to explain faculty motivation by using models and research 
from organizational behavior with emphasis on motivation theories that might provide useful 
insights for future research on the influence of self-knowledge characteristics on faculty 
entrepreneurship.  According to Staw, much of faculty behavior is voluntary in nature, self-governed 
and sustained by intrinsic outcomes.  However, as universities experience a shortage of resources, 
faculty might begin to seek these externally administrated rewards because as universities’ resource 
allocation shrinks, the value of universities’ external rewards for faculty increases, even to the extent 
of becoming a primary indicator of personal achievement.  This model offers an individualistic 
perspective to faculty behavior in light of external rewards and might help to explain the findings 
from previous research indicating that academic partnerships with industry are not likely to satisfy 
some fundamental traditional forms of faculty rewards.  
The career construct as an individual characteristic in the Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) 
framework has a significant influence on self-knowledge and is moderately influenced by 
productivity.  This construct clearly affects faculty engagement with academic capitalism because on 
the one hand, type of discipline and institution are key elements in faculty patenting productivity 
given that it is a phenomenon occurring mainly at Research I universities and in applied fields 
closely aligned with the market.  Moreover, according to Seashore et al. (1989), degree of career 
establishment is also influences the entrepreneurial behavior of faculty.  
The Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) framework considers socio-demographic characteristics 
as the strongest influence on faculty productivity given its significant impact on self-knowledge.  
Socio-demographic characteristics also influence significantly career.  However, little research has 
been conducted on the impact of socio-demographic characteristics constructs on faculty 
entrepreneurship, which suggests a promising area for future research.  Finally, the last component 
of the Blackburn and Lawrence model refers to social contingencies such as marriage, childbirths or 
death that influence individuals’ behavior in any organization.   
The Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) framework is helpful for understanding the factors 
involved in faculty patenting productivity.  Based on this framework and previous research, this 
study focuses on the tension generated in faculty self-knowledge by the incompatible rewards 
systems and values brought by industry and academics in environments involved in academic 
capitalism and how these mixed messages might affect faculty patenting productivity.   
 
Administrative Control over the Faculty Profession 
 
Campbell and Slaughter (1999) conducted a study based on questionnaires mailed to 127 
administrators and 280 faculty across disciplines from 86 Carnegie institutions and found that one of 
the major points of tension between faculty and administrators as a consequence of 
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commercialization of research is administrators’ willingness to control resources and relationships 
generated by faculty-industry partnerships.  University administrators seek control over faculty 
research with commercial potential in order to patent and license it to industrial partners.  Similarly, 
other authors have stressed the fact that faculty involved in research with commercial potential and 
subject to contractual obligations with industry representatives lose control over their IP and 
autonomy over their professional lives given the secrecy demanded by corporations as well as the 
timelines and specific research results demanded by sponsors (Kirk, 2000; Scott 1998).  However, 
managing faculty cannot be as direct as it is with industry employees, whose behavior is non-
voluntary and driven directly by established organizational outcomes.  For example, faculty might 
not be always interested in the same institutional outcomes that administrators want, and when 
administrators attempt to impose certain behaviors on faculty they must often first consult with 
some form of faculty self-governance.   
In the academic world, administrative control has traditionally been limited by the significant 
influence of peer professional groups, which provide symbolic rewards and professional mobility.  
Thus, Staw (1983) suggests heavy-handed control of faculty behavior as a way to diminish faculty 
self-governance and self-motivation.  However, this approach will negate the primary strengths of 
universities and higher education will become more of a corporate industry.  An intermediate path 
proposed by Staw would be for administrators to become facilitators rather than controllers who 
provide an environment that best meets the intrinsic interests of faculty.  According to the 
Blackburn and Lawrence (1995) framework, this approach would diminish the tension originated in 
the social-knowledge construct of their model due to incompatible values and rewards between 
industry and academics as faculty values of self-governance and independence are not significantly 
oppressed.   
Nevertheless, limited budgets and scarce resources tend to move administrators away from 
the role of facilitators towards the role of an enforcer of priorities (Staw, 1983).  This struggle for 
control over faculty profession and products can be explained by resource dependency theory, 
which suggests that organizations and units within organizations engaged in an enduring 
competition over scarce resources and thus, conflicts and struggles to obtain these resources are an 
ongoing part of organizational life (Pfeffer, 1994).  Following this argument, industrial partnerships 
constitute a critical resource for university administrators necessary to sustain external revenues and 
prestige given the current political and economical arena of globalization and privatization 
(Campbell & Slaughter, 1999).  However, university administrators’ drive to increase external 
funding for research through faculty-industry partnerships produces struggles of control over the 
faculty profession (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  This control is often in direct opposition with the 
fundamental value of academic freedom.  As a result, administrators' interest in profits and 
competition are increasingly entering occupations and fields historically controlled by the faculty 
profession, which challenges faculty monopolies of practice and the authority of faculty as experts.  
Thus, conflicts of interests between academics and administrators result as their respective 
monopolies aim to control each other.  In sum, administrators are challenged to act in ways that 
could channel faculty behavior towards a desire institutional outcome without, at the same time, 
suppressing faculty intrinsic interests and academic values.   
To synthesize, 1) The traditional role of faculty is the one of creativity and discovery, and 
academic freedom and individualism are indispensable for such an aim.  Moreover, the academic 
profession has traditional values rich on intrinsic rewards and recognition in opposition to business-
oriented values and rewards brought by industry sponsors.  Therefore, if higher education continues 
to engage in academic capitalism, a delicate balance between the traditional values and rewards of 
the academic profession and the ones brought by faculty-industry partnerships should be achieved in 
order to best maximize the benefits and satisfaction for both faculty and administrators on 
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university campuses engaged with academic capitalism; 2) University administrators are seeking 
sources of revenues and prestige through partnerships with industry, which result in an increase of 
administrators' control over the faculty profession and thus, tensions between faculty and 
administrators are likely to occur.  
Based on the framework developed, this study is designed to analyze the IP policies at nine 
Research I universities in order to explore which types of policies appear to be most closely related 
to higher levels of patent productivity as an important intended outcome of commercial research 
ventures in higher education.  The findings from this analysis are then discussed in relation to the 
theoretical framework as the basis for policy recommendations that can be used by leaders at 
Research I universities. 
 
Methods 
 
An exploratory comparative analysis among peer Research I universities’ IP policies in 
relation to their patenting productivity provides insights regarding which aspects of the IP policies 
might motivate faculty to engage with entrepreneurship according to the theoretical framework on 
faculty productivity.  Given the wide variety of Research I universities, a comparative analysis needs 
to be conducted among universities with similar levels of performance that might affect patenting 
levels.  Therefore, the first stage of this study consisted of the determination of peer universities by 
using the top 50 research universities as they were ranked by Lombardi, Craig, Capaldi, Gater, and 
Mendonca (2001) with similar parameters of performance regarding patenting productivity.  The 
second stage consisted of a comparative analysis of the IP policies of the universities selected in the 
first stage guided by the framework developed.  The following sections describe the two 
methodological stages used in this study. 
 
Determination of Peer Universities 
 
The initial purpose of this study was to identify peer universities for comparison with one 
particular public research university (coded university A) in order to identify aspects of the IP 
policies that might facilitate or inhibit patenting activity.  As mentioned above, the determination of 
the peer universities in relation to University A was based on a cross-sectional sampling of research 
universities in the nation from the top 50 research universities ranked by Lombardi, et al. (2001).  In 
their report, universities were ranked at a campus level according to nine measures including 
investment in total and federal research, endowment assets, annual giving, postdoctoral appointees, 
doctorates granted, faculty members of the National Academy, faculty awards, and median SAT 
score for the years 1999 and 2000.  This ranking method consisted of counting how many times 
each research institution ranked in the top 25 on each of these nine measures.  A similar 
methodology was used to produce a second set of institutions ranked 26 through 50.   
Eight peer universities were identified for University A through a two-step process.  The 
first step consisted of drawing four sets (Set 1-Set 4) from Lombardi et al.’s top-50 research 
universities (2001) as follows:  The first two sets included all of the top-50 research universities 
where Set 1 had absolute values for the nine measures used at Lombardi’s ranking and Set 2 had 
normalized values by the number of doctorates granted in the year 1999.  Sets 3 and 4 were drawn 
from the top-50 by choosing the five universities ranking above and the five universities ranking 
below University A at each of these nine measures.  As in Set 1 and Set 2, Set 3 and Set 4 had 
absolute values and normalized values by the number of doctorates granted respectively.  Both 
absolute and normalized values were used in order to control for size at each university.     
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In the second step, an utility function (Clemen, 1952) was applied to each university of these 
four different sets drawn in the first step.  This utility function provides information on how similar 
a given university is to University A according to the nine measures used to generate the Lombardi 
et al.’s (2001) ranking.  Once the utility function was applied, the universities that were closer in 
terms of similarity to University A in Sets 1 to 4 simultaneously were selected.  Finally, only public 
institutions without a medical school (like University A) were chosen and considered peers of 
University A.  
 
The Utility Function 
 
Mathematically, the utility function is denoted as im , where i is an index that identifies each 
university from the four sets drawn in the first step.  This utility function determines how close to 
University A the other universities are according to the relevance of the nine parameters used by 
Lombardi et al. (2001) to patenting levels.  Mathematically, a comparatively small value of the utility 
function ( im ) of a given university means that this university and University A are similar in terms 
of the nine parameters weighted as predictors of patenting levels.   
Each of the nine parameters per university are represented by the variable ijx where j 
identifies each of these parameters.  For example, if the parameters are coded from 1 to 9 and the 
universities at each set are numbered, 105x  is the parameter number five of the university number ten 
from a given set.  Similarly, ujx  corresponds to the value of University A at the parameter number j.  
According to this notation, the utility function for each university \at each set was defined as: 
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jW  is a weight assigned to each of the parameters based on a qualitative assessment of the degree of 
relevance of each measure to patenting levels.  The numerical values of the weights for each 
parameter were assigned qualitatively (Table 1) based on a scale from zero to 100 depending on how 
these parameters are expected to determine the amount of patenting at each university.  In general, 
financial parameters were considered as primary predictors of patenting levels because the nature of 
the research in fields that are likely to generate patentable outcomes is expensive and requires 
significant amounts of funding.   
Following this line of argument, total research expenditures were considered most influential 
on patenting levels over total federal research expenditures because total research expenditures 
includes funds from private sponsors.  However, federal research funds are also strong predictors of 
patenting levels given that the Bayh-Dole Act allows commercialization of research funded by 
federal funds.  The number of postdoctoral appointees and doctorates granted were considered as 
third and fourth in relevance to patenting levels after financial incentives research because these 
members of the research community are considered valuable skill research workforce (Slaughter et 
al., 2002).  Endowment awards were placed fifth given that although they usually provide basic 
infrastructure for research, endowments are not directly involved in the generation of products with 
commercial value.  Sixth and seventh places were assigned to number of faculty awards and 
members of the national academy respectively as measures of the quality of scholars at each 
university.  Finally, annual giving was placed in eighth place because it contributes to research 
productivity and patenting although in a lesser degree than the seventh measures above it.  The 
ninth measure, median SAT score, is a measure of undergraduate education and thus, it was given 
no weight at all given its irrelevance to patenting levels.   
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Table 1  
Criteria used for defining weighted parameters of  
the utility function used to define peer institutions 
 
Parameter Points 
  1999 Total Research 100 
  1999 Federal Research 80 
  1999 Postdoctoral Appointees 60 
  2000 Doctorates Granted 50* 
  2000 Endowment Assets 30 
  2000 Faculty Awards 25 
  2000 National Academy, 25 
  2000 Annual Giving, 20 
  1999 Median SAT Score 0 
      *or 0 when used for normalizing in Set 2 and Set 4 
 
Intellectual Property Policies Analysis 
 
The policy analysis was conducted in three stages:  The first stage consisted of a content 
analysis to identify major overlapping sections within the policy guidelines for each of the nine 
universities being investigated in this study.  The second stage was based on the results of the 
content analysis and focused on identifying the sections that might influence patenting levels at these 
universities.  Finally, the third stage was based on a comparative analysis of the sections identified in 
the second stage and the levels at patenting across the nine universities.  As a result of the 
comparative analysis, each university was qualitatively ranked in descendent order according to the 
relative intensity of each section identified in stage two and patenting levels..  Patenting levels were 
defined as the number of patents issued as of August of 2002 over the average amount of R&D 
dollars expended during the years from 1998 to 2000.  Given that patents usually take up to two 
years to be issued since filed, we used a two-year funding up to the year 2000 and number of patents 
up to the year 2002. 
Control over faculty profession by administrators as well as rewards structures and values 
were the two key factors identified in previous empirical studies and used to develop the theoretical 
framework.  Thus, the sections in the IP policies identified through the content analysis as measures 
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of rewards to inventors as a result of commercialization of research were the provisions regarding to 
the distribution of royalties to inventors and to their research unit.  The sections related to 
administrators’ control over faculty academic works chosen were the ones related to ownership of 
IP, disclosure of inventions, administration of the policy, and the degree of flexibility of the policy.  
The provision regarding ownership of IP determines the circumstances in which faculty own their 
work.  Disclosure of inventions to administrative officials determines under which circumstances 
faculty must disclose their research.  Administration of the policy refers to the type of administrative 
structure that makes decisions regarding IP issues.  For example, a policy might determine that 
decisions are made by a committee mainly composed by faculty or such decisions are made by one 
or two administrators.  Degree of flexibility of the IP policy refers to the policy’s basic structure 
between a general guideline where decisions are made on a case-by-case basis or a detailed policy 
that include provisions in an attempt to cover all possible cases.   
 
Results 
The universities in this study were coded UA for University A and UB, UC, UD, UE, UH, 
UI, UJ, and UK for the eight peer universities of UA.  In addition, the universities were classified 
into four groups according to their patenting levels, which are low, moderate, high and highest.  
Figure 2 represents the patenting levels of all the institutions used in this study.  The group with 
highest patenting levels has only one university (UB), given that it’s patenting level is much higher 
than the other institutions in this study.  Similarly, the group with lowest patenting levels has only 
one university (UK) because its patenting level is much lower than the rest.  The group with high 
patenting levels is composed by UC, UD, and UE and the group with moderate patenting levels 
include UA, UH, UI and UJ.  The results of the comparative IP policies analysis are represented in 
Figure 3.   
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Figure 2. Patenting productivity levels of nine Research I Universities 
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Highest patenting levels group (UB) 
 
UB exerts the highest control over faculty profession and it is the second most generous in 
royalties to inventors’ research unit after UD, although interestingly, these two universities are 
fourth and seventh respectively in distribution of royalties to inventors.  Based on the policies 
analyzed, some of the measures used to exert tight control include mandatory disclosure of all 
inventions regardless of their nature and commercial potential, ownership by the university of all IP 
regardless of the amount of use of university's resources as well as the inclusion of specific 
provisions in the IP policy regarding ownership of software, distance learning materials, lab notes, 
and all types of research data as well as specific provisions regarding proper archiving of lab and 
research notes of inventions.   
 
High patenting levels group (UC, UD and UE) 
 
 UD and UE have a similar policy of relativity generosity to faculty, although UD is the most 
generous with the inventors’ research unit whereas UE is more generous with inventors directly.  In 
both cases, these universities exert significant control over faculty profession, although UD controls 
more in general.  UC, which is the leader in patenting levels of this group, has the second most 
generous policy in terms of overall rewards to inventors and is third in revenues to the inventors’ 
research unit.  Interestingly, UC policy emphasizes flexibility given that almost all the decisions are 
made by a committee of mainly faculty and in a case-by-case basis.  Thus, UC policy appears to be 
very democratic, flexible and generous in terms of royalties to inventors.  This model, based on a 
flexible and democratic policy may be effective in terms of patenting levels, given UC’s second place 
overall in patenting levels after UB, which contrary to UC has a policy of exerting tight control over 
faculty profession.  According to the theoretical framework, this result suggests that UC is exerting 
minimum control over faculty profession, which in return creates fewer tensions between faculty 
and administrators and more faculty willingness to engage in for-profit venues due to the generous 
material rewards of this university to inventors and their research unit. 
 
Moderate patenting levels group (UH, UA, UI and UJ) 
 
These universities are mainly characterized by having a moderate policy in terms of rewards 
and vague in terms of control over faculty profession compared to the two groups above them.  The 
policies of this group are considered moderate because they are not as generous in terms of royalties 
compared to their peer universities in the two groups above them and vague because they do not 
have a clear policy of either tight or loose control over faculty works.  In other words, the IP policies 
of this group are inconsistent in terms of degree of control across the variables regarding control 
over faculty profession.  UH, the leader in patenting levels of this group, has a policy that is similar 
but more vague and moderate to UC's policy.  On the one hand, UH is third in one of the control 
parameters and last in the other two, which suggests that UH has a policy of minimum control over 
faculty profession similar to UC’s, but to a lesser degree.  On the other hand, UH is sixth in rewards 
to inventors' research unit but it is second in rewards to inventors.  Finally, UA, UI and UJ have 
lower levels of rewards to both inventors and inventors’ research unit and a more vague policy of 
control than UH.   
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Low patenting levels group (UK)  
 
UK has the lowest levels of rewards to inventors and their research unit and a vague policy 
of control over faculty profession given that its policy is comparatively strong in some sections and 
weak in some others regarding control over faculty profession.   
In synthesis, the universities with IP policies that exert the highest control over faculty 
profession and are the most generous in the distribution of royalties to the inventors’ research unit 
have the first and third levels of patenting—UB and UD.  UC is the most generous in royalties to 
inventors and the least controlling of faculty profession and has the second highest level of 
patenting.  The universities that are vague in their control policy and moderate in royalties to 
inventors and their research unit constitute the third group in patenting levels.  Finally, the lowest 
group constituted by UK has also a vague policy in terms of control over faculty profession and 
offer the least amount of royalties to inventors and their research unit.   
 
Discussion 
 
The results of this study indicate that in the case of the universities studied, material rewards 
to faculty, especially rewards to the research unit of the inventor, may exert a significant influence on 
patenting productivity in instances where tight control over faculty profession is also in place.  
However, the remarkable exception of UC’s policy, which is the most flexible, mainly governed by 
faculty, and generous in terms of total royalties to both inventors and inventors’ research unit, opens 
the question of whether tight control over faculty profession by administrators is necessary in order 
to achieve high levels of patenting productivity.   
Although the size of the sample in this study was small and therefore generalization to the 
population of Research I universities is limited, these results support the theoretical framework 
developed for this study.  On the one hand, tight control over faculty profession, if balanced with a 
policy of generous material rewards to faculty research unit seems to return high patenting levels.  
According to Stew (1983), although tight control still generates tension in the social knowledge of 
faculty members, monetary incentives in times of budgetary constraints become a valuable reward 
that brings personal satisfaction to faculty and thus, balances such a tension.  Moreover, monetary 
rewards that allow faculty to continue pursuing research satisfy intrinsic motivations of the academic 
profession such as the fascination for research and prestige (Clark, 1997).  In this case, material 
rewards are transformed into symbolic rewards brought by the scholarship of research.   
On the other hand, if the control over faculty profession is low, as it is in the case of UC, 
monetary rewards directly to the inventor seem to be an effective incentive.  According to the 
theoretical framework, if academic fundamental values are not threatened, then the tension due to 
conflictive messages of values and rewards in the social knowledge of faculty diminishes.  Therefore, 
faculty are more likely to engage with entrepreneurship given the external monetary rewards and 
prestige that these activities offer.   
In sum, by following the theoretical framework developed for this study and supported by 
the findings from the comparative analysis conducted, it appears that universities should have a clear 
policy of either tight or loose control over the faculty profession as well as generous monetary 
rewards to inventors and the inventors’ research unit.  However, if tight control is chosen as the 
predominant policy, it is important to compensate such control through generous rewards to 
inventors’ research unit.  If moderate control is preferred, then the policy should perhaps be 
generous with inventors directly.  In general, it appears that IP policies that aim to achieve an 
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optimal balance between control over faculty profession and academic rewards structures are most 
likely to generate higher levels of patenting levels.  
This exploratory study has illuminated ways in which university administrators could 
improve the patenting levels on their campuses through IP policies.  However, much research is 
needed in order to understand the interplay between faculty motivations and administrators’ 
mechanisms to produce more commercial research including research with emphasis on individual 
characteristics.   
Other themes for future research build on the limitations of this study itself.  For example, 
this study was based on document analysis of the policies while leaving policy implementations and 
enforcements aside.  Another limitation of this study is the qualitative nature of the comparative 
analysis and the ranking of the universities at each variable, which implied a series of subjective 
assumptions and decisions.  Finally, the limited sample used constitutes another limitation of this 
study.   
Significant changes are taking place in higher education as academic capitalism grows in 
American colleges and universities.  These changes can be categorized in three main areas, which are 
epistemological shifts, changes in the academic profession and in graduate education.  
Epistemological shifts refer to the increase of managerial and entrepreneurship values in higher 
education in opposition to the traditional academic norms of knowledge creation and dissemination 
as well as social service (Gumport, 2002).  Some of the most significant changes in the academic 
profession documented include: overemphasis in applied research (Campbell & Slaughter, 1999; 
Gladieux & King, 1999; Slaughter et al., 2002); less time spent by faculty in teaching and advising 
and more time spent in writing grants, reports, patent applications, and other entrepreneurial 
activities (Gumport, 2002; Kerr, 2002; Milem, Berger & Day, 2000; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997); 
secrecy of knowledge; and the fostering of a hierarchy based on prestige and salary differences 
between entrepreneurial faculty and faculty who are not engaged in for-profit ventures (Becher, 
1989).  Finally, graduate students, who posses research skills, have become valuable labor for 
industry representatives and tokens of exchange for faculty members in order to consolidate 
partnerships with private sponsors (Slaughter et al., 2002).  As a result, the implications to graduate 
education and graduate students are significant, especially from an organizational culture and 
socialization perspective.  
By looking at factors that might affect patenting levels at Research I universities, this study 
offers a perspective to understand faculty behavior in light of academic capitalism.  Given the 
significant impact of academic capitalism on higher education according to previous studies, more 
studies such as this one would allow us to better understand this new trend in order to discover ways 
to intentionally guide the fate of higher education in light of external economical and political forces 
such as academic capitalism.   
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